Secrecy-Optimized Resource Allocation for Device-to-Device Communication
  Underlaying Heterogeneous Networks by Zhang, Kecheng et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
9.
05
03
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  1
5 S
ep
 20
17
1
Secrecy-Optimized Resource Allocation for
Device-to-Device Communication Underlaying
Heterogeneous Networks
Kecheng Zhang, Mugen Peng, Senior Member, IEEE, Ping Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Xuelong Li, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Device-to-device (D2D) communications recently
have attracted much attention for its potential capability to im-
prove spectral efficiency underlaying the existing heterogeneous
networks (HetNets). Due to no sophisticated control, D2D user
equipments (DUEs) themselves cannot resist eavesdropping or
security attacks. It is urgent to maximize the secure capacity for
both cellular users and DUEs. This paper formulates the radio
resource allocation problem to maximize the secure capacity
of DUEs for the D2D communication underlaying HetNets
which consist of high power nodes and low power nodes. The
optimization objective function with transmit bit rate and power
constraints, which is non-convex and hard to be directly derived,
is firstly transformed into matrix form. Then the equivalent
convex form of the optimization problem is derived according
to the Perron-Frobenius theory. A heuristic iterative algorithm
based on the proximal theory is proposed to solve this equivalent
convex problem through evaluating the proximal operator of
Lagrange function. Numerical results show that the proposed
radio resource allocation solution significantly improves the
secure capacity with a fast convergence speed.
Index Terms—Device-to-device communication, heterogeneous
network, secure capacity, resource allocation
I. INTRODUCTION
Heterogeneous networks (HetNets), which are expected to
significantly improve capacity and extend coverage, have been
widely applied to affording the explosive growth of data
traffic [1]. A HetNet uses a mixture of high power nodes
(HPNs) (e.g., macro or micro base stations (BSs)) and low
power nodes (LPNs) (e.g., picocell BSs, femtocell BSs, small
cell BSs, wireless relay, or distributed antennas) in the same
coverage. HPNs are deployed to provide seamless connectivity
and guarantee the basic quality of service (QoS) requirements
of user equipments (UEs). Since the transmit power of HPNs
is sufficiently high to achieve seamless coverage, all UEs often
access the HPN to obtain the control signalling of the whole
HetNet, which fulfills the decouple of control and user planes
[2]. In some hot spots with huge value of packet traffic, a UE
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prefers to access LPNs rather than HPNs because LPNs can
provide much higher capacity than the HPN does. Therefore,
the dense deployment of LPNs increases spectral efficiency
(SE) and is one of the key factors for boosting the capacity
of the future network [3]. However, although the HetNet is a
good alternative to improve SE with seamless coverage, the
inter-tier interference between HPNs and LPNs is severe, and
the backhaul is often constrained because UEs have to connect
with the core network with a high capacity requirement [4].
In order to alleviate the heavy load on backhaul, several
alternative approaches have been presented. In particular, a
hierarchical cloud computing architecture is proposed in [5]
through adding a mobile dynamic cloud.
To alleviate the heavy burden on the backhaul and improve
SE in HetNets, device-to-device (D2D) communication which
is defined as direct communication between UEs without
passing through BSs has been proposed in the 3rd generation
partnership project long term evolution-advanced [6]. With
more traffic being transmitted by D2D communication, infor-
mation exchange between UEs and core network is abated [7].
Recently, D2D communication has attracted much attention
with the ever increasing demand for the local content exchange
between two nearby UEs. In D2D underlaying HetNets, radio
resource is typically reused between the direct D2D link
and the cellular air access link. As a result, the inter-tier
interference is critical to make D2D communication rollout.
Many works have been done to improve SE for the D2D
communication underlaying HetNets. In [8], the authors show
that D2D communications can effectively improve the total
throughput without generating harmful interference to HetNets
with proper managment. In [9], the harmful inter-system inter-
ference problems for D2D underlaying cellular networks are
addressed, in which two interference avoidance mechanisms
are applied to suppress the inter-tier interference between cel-
lular and D2D links. Other recent researches, e.g., [10]–[12],
also have verified that the D2D communication underlaying
HetNets have several advantages, including the high spectral
utilization, the low energy consumption, and incurring new
packet services. To improve SE, the resource allocation should
be optimized for D2D communication underlaying HetNets,
which is a non-convex optimization problem. The non-convex
optimization problem has been extensively researched, in
which the Lagrangian dual method has been widely used
[13], [14]. However, it is assumed that the interference from
cellular users to D2D users is constant in [13] and the inter-tier
2interference between cellular users and D2D users is replaced
by the maximum allowed noise in [14]. These assumptions
simplify the problem and cannot achieve the best performance.
To tackle this problem, new optimization method should be
applied for D2D communication underlaying HetNets.
Meanwhile, to enhance the security of wireless transmis-
sion, physical layer security has been developed based on
information theoretic concepts [15]–[17]. Physical-layer se-
curity, which exploits the physical characteristics of wireless
channel to enhance the security, has significantly influenced
the wireless communication because there exists a secured
data transmission between power nodes and the eavsedropper
[18]. To avoid the information from power nodes to UEs being
leaked, the data rate of eavesdroppers should be maintained
at a low level. With a more open control plane, D2D user
equipment is more vulnerable to the attacks of eavesdroppers.
There have been some studies to improve the secure capacity
of D2D underlaying systems from the viewpoint of physical-
layer security. In [19], two secure capacity optimization
problems for a multi-input and multi-output secrecy channel
with multiple D2D communications are researched and two
conservative approximation approaches to convert the proba-
bility based constraints into the deterministic constraint have
been addressed. Furthermore, the radio resource allocation
as a matching problem in a weighted bipartite graph has
been formulated in [20], in which the Kuhn-Munkres (KM)
algorithm to obtain the optimal solution is proposed. However,
the D2D communication only helps to improve the secure
capacity of cellular UEs by confusing the eavesdroppers in
both [19] and [20]. In other words, the D2D communication
acts as a kind of interference against eavesdropping when
an eavesdropper tries to overhear the cellular communication,
therefore, the available rate of eavesdropper is lessened [21].
To our best knowledge, there have been few publications to
optimize the secure capacity of both cellular UEs and D2D
links. In particular, few works maximize the secure capacity
of the D2D communication underlaying HetNets. Note that
such secure capacity optimization problem is non-convex and
hard to be directly solved because of the existence of inter-tier
and intra-tier interference.
The goal of this paper is to optimize the radio resource
allocation aiming to maximize the secure capacity of D2D
communication underlaying HetNets. The non-convex objec-
tive function with several constraints are first transformed
into matrix form. Then, the equivalent convex form of the
matrix form is derived according to the Perron-Frobenius
theory which is based on the eigenvalue and eigenvector
[22]–[24]. Note that the Perron-Frobenius theory has been
mainly used in homogeneous networks, there are lack of
publications to use this theory to address the optimization
issue in the D2D communication underlaying HetNets. To
derive this Perron-Frobenius theory based equivalent convex
optimization problem, the corresponding Lagrange function
has been formulated and the proximal operator has been
evaluated. Finally, a novel iterative algorithm based on the
proximal theory has been proposed. The main contributions
of this paper can be summarized as following:
• The optimization problem of radio resource allocation
aiming to maximize the secure capacity in D2D commu-
nication underlaying HetNets has been addressed in this
paper. To our best knowledge, previous works mainly take
D2D communication as friendly jammer to improve the
secure capacity of cellular users. Thus, only the perfor-
mance of cellular users is optimized and the performance
of D2D communication is ignored. Furthermore, previous
works mainly focus on the traditional SE and do not focus
on the secure capacity. Besides, when solving the opti-
mization problem, previous works mainly try to simplify
the interference between cellular users and D2D users by
setting the interference with constant, which cannot take
full advantage of the benefit of subcarrier reusing. This
paper explores the resource allocation scheme for both
cellular users and D2D users when they share the same
subcarrier resource to maximize the secure capacity of
D2D communication underlaying HetNets.
• To deal with the secrecy-optimized resource allocation
problem, a non-convex objective function has been for-
mulated. This non-convex objective function is hard to
be directly derived. The existing works often simplify
the interference into constant, and then the Lagrangian
dual theory can be used. However, the interference in
the D2D underlaying HetNets is often dynamical and
should not be regarded as constant. To deal with this
non-convex issue, the objective function is transformed
to an equivalent convex optimization problem according
to the Perron-Frobenius theory. Furthermore, to solve the
equivalent convex problem, an iterative algorithm based
on the proximal theory consisting of both outer and
inner loop optimizations has been proposed to achieve
the global optimal solution.
• The SE performance of the proposed resource alloca-
tion solution has been numerically evaluated. Simulation
results show that the proposed iterative algorithm can
promptly converge and outperforms the baseline algo-
rithms. The effects of the QoS and power constraints with
various other comparisons have been shown to evaluate
the performance gains of the proposals.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, the system model of D2D communication under-
laying HetNets will be described and the optimization problem
will be formulated. The solution to the optimization problem
and the corresponding iterative algorithm will be presented in
Section III. Section IV will provide simulations to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and the corresponding
solutions. Finally, the paper will be concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A D2D communication underlaying HetNets is shown in
Fig. 1, in which L LPNs sharing N subcarriers with the HPN
is considered. It is assumed that each subcarrier occupies B
MHz bandwidth. The HPN and LPNs are all closed accessed.
The closed access means that each cell can only schedule
the UEs that belong to it, while the open access means that
one cell can schedule any UE as long as the reference signal
receiving power is sufficiently high. Similar assumption can be
3found in previous works [25], [26]. Under the closed access,
UEs monopolize their own serving cells and the privacy and
security of the communication can be guaranteed, though the
performance of closed access is worse than that of open access.
Since this paper focus on the secure capacity, the closed
access is only considered. Let H denote the average number
of HPN-accessed UEs (HUEs) in each HPN and M denote
the average number of LPN-accessed UEs (LUEs) in each
LPN, respectively. Besides, K D2D-worked UEs (DUEs) co-
exist with LUEs in each LPN. It is assumed that all UEs
(e.g., HUEs, LUEs or DUEs) have low mobility so that the
channel state information between UEs and power nodes as
well as the channel state information between the transmitter
and receiver of any D2D user pair remain stationary [27]–
[29]. Therefore, subcarriers can be assumed to be independent
from each other, and the channel fading of each subcarrier
can be assumed the same within a time slot, but may vary
cross different subcarriers. On each subcarrier, there exists
an eavesdropper that leverages the information of the desired
UEs. Since DUEs prefer to share the uplink radio resources
with HUEs or LUEs to avoid the severe inter-tier interference,
this paper only focuses on the resource allocation to optimized
the secure capacity in uplink.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
HPN high power node
LPN low power node
HUE HPN-accessed UE
LUE LPN-accessed UE
DUE D2D-worked UE
hHHhn the channel gain from the h-th HUE to the HPN on the n-th
subcarrier
hHLhnl the channel gain from the h-th HUE to the l-th LPN on the n-th
subcarrier
hHDhnlk the channel gain from the h-th HUE to the receiver of the k-th
DUE pair of the l-th LPN on the n-th subcarrier
hHEhn the channel gain from the h-th HUE to the eavesdropper on the
n-th subcarrier
hLHlmn the channel gain from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the HPN
on the n-th subcarrier
hLLlmnj the channel gain from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the j-th
LPN on the n-th subcarrier
hLDlmnjk the channel gain from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the
receiver of the k-th DUE pair of the j-th LPN on the n-th
subcarrier
hLElmn the channel gain from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the
eavesdropper on the n-th subcarrier
hDHlkn the channel gain from the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the
l-th LPN to the HPN on the n-th subcarrier
hDLlknj the channel gain from the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the
l-th LPN to the j-th LPN on the n-th subcarrier
hLDlmnjk the channel gain from the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the
l-th LPN to the receiver of the i-th DUE pair of the j-th LPN on
the n-th subcarrier
hLElmn the channel gain from the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the
l-th LPN to to the eavesdropper on the n-th subcarrier
pHhn the transmit power of the h-th HUE on the n-th subcarrier
pLlmn the transmit power of the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN on the n-th
subcarrier
pDlkn the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the l-th LPN on the n-th
subcarrier
αHhn subcarrier allocation index which denotes whether the n-th sub-
carrier is allocated to the h-th HUE
αLlmn subcarrier allocation index which denotes whether the n-th sub-
carrier is allocated to the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN
αDlkn subcarrier allocation index which denotes whether the n-th sub-
carrier is allocated to the k-th DUE pair of the l-th LPN
Let hHHhn , h
HL
hnl , h
HD
hnlk, and h
HE
hn denote the radio channel
Fig. 1. D2D communication underlaying HetNets.
gain from the h-th HUE to the HPN, from the h-th HUE to
the l-th LPN, from the h-th HUE to the receiver of the k-th
DUE pair of the l-th LPN, and from the h-th HUE to the
eavesdropper on the n-th subcarrier, respectively. Meanwhile,
hLHlmn, h
LL
lmnj , h
LD
lmnjk, and h
LE
lmn denote the radio channel gain
from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the HPN, from the
m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the j-th LPN, from the m-th
LUE of the l-th LPN to the receiver of the k-th DUE pair of
the j-th LPN, and from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to the
eavesdropper on the n-th subcarrier, respectively. Similarly, let
hDHlkn , h
DL
lknj , h
DD
lknji , and h
DE
lkn denote the channel gain from
the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the l-th LPN to the
HPN, to the j-th LPN, to the receiver of the i-th DUE pair of
the j-th LPN, and to the eavesdropper on the n-th subcarrier,
respectively. Denote pHhn, p
L
lmn, and p
D
lkn by the transmit power
of the h-th HUE, the transmit power of the m-th LUE of the
l-th LPN, and the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair of the
l-th LPN on the n-th subcarrier, respectively. In orthogonal
frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) based wireless
networks, a base station allocates orthogonal subcarriers to
different users. Thus, in each cell (e.g., an HPN or a LPN),
each subcarrier can be allocated to only one cellular UE or
a DUE pair [30]–[32], but one or more subcarriers can be
allocated to the same cellular UE or a DUE pair. It means
that at most one element of
(
pHh1, p
H
h2, · · · p
H
hN
)
is positive and
the others are all zero. Let αHhn, α
L
lmn, α
D
lkn ∈ {0, 1} denote
the allocation index of subcarriers, which denotes whether the
n-th subcarrier is allocated to the h-th HUE, the m-th LUE
of the l-th LPN, and the k-th DUE pair of the l-th LPN or
not, respectively. It should be noted that eavesdroppers are
passive and will not share its CSI with the HPN or LPN. In
fact, if eavesdroppers keep silent all the time, it is impossible
for the network to estimate the CSI of them. However, when
eavesdropper become active, they can be detected by the
network [33]. Thus, in this paper, the CSI of eavesdropper
is assumed to be known and similar assumption can be found
in previous works [34]–[36].
The uplink signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR)from the h-th HUE to the HPN on the n-th subcarrier
ρHhn can be expressed as:
4ρHhn =
αHhnp
H
hnh
HH
hn
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
αLlmnp
L
lmnh
LH
lmn +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
αDlknp
D
lknh
DH
lkn +Bσ
2
.
(1)
The uplink SINR from the h-th HUE to the eavesdropper
on the n-th subcarrier ρHEhn can be expressed as:
ρHEhn =
αHhnp
H
hnh
HE
hn
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
αLlmnp
L
lmnh
LE
ln +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
αDlknp
D
lknh
DE
lkn +Bσ
2
.
(2)
The uplink SINR from the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN to
the l-th LPN on the n-th subcarrier ρLlmn can be expressed as:
ρLlmn =
αLlmnp
L
lmnh
LL
lmnl
ILlmn + σ
2
, (3)
where ILlmn denotes the interference and is expressed as:
ILlmn=
H∑
h=1
αHhnp
H
hnh
HL
hnl +
L∑
j=1,j 6=l
M∑
i=1
αLjinp
L
jinh
LL
jinl
+
L∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
αDjknp
D
jknh
DL
jknl . (4)
The uplink SINR from the the l-th LPN to the eavesdropper
on the n-th subcarrier ρLElmn can be expressed as:
ρLElmn=
αLlmnp
L
lmnh
LE
lmn
ILElmn + σ
2
, (5)
where ILElmn denotes the interference and is expressed as:
ILElmn =
H∑
h=1
αHhnp
H
hnh
HE
hn +
L∑
j=1,j 6=l
M∑
i=1
αLjinp
L
jinh
LE
jn
+
L∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
αDjknp
D
jknh
DE
jkn. (6)
The uplink SINR from the transmitter of the k-th DUE pair
of the l-the LPN to the receiver of the k-th DUE pair of the
l-the LPN on the n-th subcarrier ρDlkn can be expressed as:
ρDlkn=
αDlknp
D
lknh
DD
lknlk
IDlkn + σ
2
, (7)
where IDlkn denotes the interference and is expressed as:
IDlkn =
H∑
h=1
αHhnp
H
hnh
HD
hnl +
L∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
αLjmnp
L
jmnh
LD
jmnl
+
L∑
j=1,j 6=l
K∑
i=1
αDjinp
D
jinh
DD
jinlk . (8)
Similarly, the uplink SINR from the transmitter of the k-th
DUE pair of the l-the LPN to the eavesdropper ρDElkn can be
expressed as:
ρDElkn=
αDlknp
D
lknh
DE
lkn
IDElkn + σ
2
, (9)
where IDElkn denotes the interference and is expressed as:
IDElkn =
H∑
h=1
αHhnp
H
hnh
HE
hn +
L∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
αLjmnp
L
jmnh
LE
ln
+
L∑
j=1,j 6=l
K∑
i=1
αLjinp
D
jinh
DE
jin . (10)
Let CHShn , C
LS
lmn, C
DS
lkn denote the secrecy capacity of the
h-th HUE, the m-th LUE of the l-th LPN, and the k-th DUE
pair of the l-the LPN, respectively. Accordingly, CHShn , C
LS
lmn,
CDSlkn can be expressed as:
CHShn = B log(1 + ρ
H
hn)−B log(1 + ρ
HE
hn ), (11)
CLSlmn = B log(1 + ρ
L
lmn)−B log(1 + ρ
LE
lmn), (12)
CDSlkn = B log(1 + ρ
D
lkn)−B log(1 + ρ
DE
lkn ), (13)
respectively. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of the D2D com-
munication underlaying HetNets can be written as:
H∑
h=1
N∑
n=1
CHShn +
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
N∑
n
CLSlmn +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
CDSlkn . (14)
It is assumed that the secrecy capacity of each UE should
be no less than the pre-defined threshold to guarantee QoS.
Meanwhile, to save the energy consumption, the maximum
allowed transmit power of each power node is limited. Besides,
the subcarrier allocation index should be restricted to prevent
the same subcarrier being allocated to more than one UE of
the same type, e.g., HUEs, LUEs, and DUEs. As a result, the
secrecy-optimized resource allocation problem for the D2D
communication underlaying HetNets can be formulated with
the QoS and transmit power constraints.
Problem 1 (Secrecy Capacity Optimization): With the con-
straints on the required QoS and maximum transmit power
allowance, the secrecy-optimized resource allocation problem
for the D2D communication underlaying HetNets can be
5formulated as:
max
{pH
hn
,pL
lmn
,pD
lkn
}
H∑
h=1
N∑
n=1
CHShn +
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
N∑
n
CLSlmn
+
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
CDSlkn (15)
s.t.
N∑
n=1
CHShn ≥ C
HS
min, ∀h, (16)
N∑
n
CLSlmn ≥ C
LS
min, ∀l,m, (17)
N∑
n=1
CDSlkn ≥ C
DS
min, ∀l, k, (18)
pHhn ≤ P
H
max, ∀h, n (19)
pLlmn ≤ P
L
max, ∀l,m, n (20)
pDlkn ≤ P
D
max, ∀l, k, n (21)
H∑
h=1
αHhn = 1, ∀n, α
H
hn ∈ {0, 1}, (22)
M∑
m=1
αLlmn = 1, ∀l, n, α
L
lmn ∈ {0, 1},(23)
K∑
k=1
αDlkn = 1, ∀l, n, α
D
lkn ∈ {0, 1}, (24)
where the constraints (16)-(18) correspond to the required
lower bound of the the secrecy capacity of HUEs, LUEs,
and DUEs, respectively. The constraints (19)-(21) represent
the maximum allowed transmit power of HUEs, LUEs, and
DUEs, respectively. The constraints (22)-(24) put limitations
on the subcarrier allocation policy so that each subcarrier can
only be allocated to at most one UE of the same type.
III. SECRECY-OPTIMIZED RESOURCE ALLOCATION
OPTIMIZATION
Joint optimization of subcarriers and transmit power is
an intractable problem [11], and the optimization problem
(15) with constraints (16)-(24) listed in Section II is non-
deterministic polynomial (NP) hard, which is impossible to
be directly solved. But it is noted that under any given the
subcarrier allocation policy, problem (15) can be transformed
to a convex form according to the Perron-Frobenius theory.
Thus, if we solve the equivalent convex problem for every
possible subcarrier allocation policy, the global optimal solu-
tion can be derived. However, such exhaustive method with
high complexity is hard to be practical. In this paper, we
solve this transformed convex-optimization problem with two
steps. In the first step, we propose a suboptimal algorithm
to allocate each user with proper subcarriers. In the second
step, we design an optimal power allocation scheme under
the subcarrier allocation policy proposed in the first step.
Similar method to tackle the NP-hard problem has been
used in previous works [37]–[39]. Based on the proposed
subcarrier allocation solution, it can be demonstrated that the
optimization problem (15) can be completely solved through
proposing the optimal power allocation solution.
A. Subcarrier Allocation
In this subsection, subcarrier allocation scheme is derived
for solving problem (15). Note that the subcarrier allocation
index is a discrete variable and for any given subcarrier
allocation scheme the optimal power allocation is independent
from the subcarrier allocation results. Therefore, the following
theorem can be holden.
Theorem 1: For any optimization problem max
{x,y}
f(x,y),
where x ∈ N1×X is a finite discrete variable vector and
each element of x is one of S integer values. y ∈ R1×Y is
continuous variable. X , S and Y are positive integers. Let xi
denote the i-th feasible solution of x, where x∗ is the optimal
x, and y∗i denote the optimal y under xi and 1 ≤ i ≤ X
S .
Therefore, x∗ can be expressed as:
x∗ = argmax
{xi}
(f(xi,y
∗
i )) . (25)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
According to Theorem 1, let x denote the subcarrier al-
location scheme and y denote the transmit power allocation
scheme, the optimal subcarrier allocation scheme can be
directly derived with exhaustive method. However, such ex-
haustive method is impractical because each subcarrier needs
to be searched to derive the optimal subcarrier allocation,
which resulting in a high complexity. In this subsection,
a suboptimal subcarrier allocation scheme is proposed to
optimize the capacity of each cell (e.g., HPNs or LPNs), which
can be expressed as:
max
H∑
h=1
N∑
n=1
log(1 +
αHhnp
H
hnh
HH
hn
Bσ2
) (26)
s.t.
H∑
h=1
N∑
n
pHhnh
HL
hnl ≤ I
H , (27)
H∑
h=1
αHhn = 1∀n, α
H
hn ∈ {0, 1}, (28)
var pHhn, α
H
hn, (29)
where IH is the maximum allowed interference caused by
HUEs.
Obviously, it can be solved by using the Lagrangian func-
tion, i.e.,
L(αHhn, p
H
hn) =
H∑
h=1
N∑
n=1
log(1 +
αHhnp
H
hnh
HH
hn
σ2
)
−λ(
H∑
h=1
N∑
n
pHhnh
HL
hnl − I
H), (30)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
6According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition, the
optimal subcarrier allocation scheme to maximize the data rate
of HPNs can be expressed as:
αHhn =
{
1 n = argmax
n
log( 1
λσ2
)−λ
[
1
λ
− σ2
]+
0 others
. (31)
Initialize the Lagrange multiplier and then use the sub-
gradient-based method [40] to search for the subcarrier al-
location scheme. The proposed algorithm is executed in each
cell (e.g., HPNs or LPNs) to a achieve good performance. In
the whole network comprised of multiple HPNs, this proposal
can work efficiently in each HPN, thus the overall performance
can be optimized.
B. Power Allocation Scheme
In this subsection, based on the aforementioned subcarrier
allocation, the power allocation to solve problem (15) is
researched. Problem (15) can be rewritten as:
H∑
h=1
N∑
n=1
CHShn +
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
N∑
n
CLSlmn +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
N∑
n=1
CDSlkn =
N∑
n=1
(
H∑
h=1
CHShn +
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
CLSlmn +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
CDSlkn
)
. (32)
In OFDMA based wireless networks, the interference be-
tween any two different subcarriers can be ignored due to
the orthogonal characteristics. Therefore, the primal objective
function can be divided into N independent subproblems,
which indicates that the primal problem can be derived by
solving the N subproblems. The n-th subproblem optimization
can be given as:
max
{pH
hn
,pL
lmn
,pD
lkn
}
H∑
h=1
CHShn +
L∑
l=1
M∑
m=1
CLSlmn +
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
CDSlkn
(33)
s.t. CHShn ≥ C
HS
min, ∀h, (34)
CLSlmn ≥ C
LS
min, ∀l,m, (35)
CDSlkn ≥ C
DS
min, ∀l, k, (36)
pHhn ≤ P
H
max, ∀h, n, (37)
pLlmn ≤ P
L
max, ∀l,m, n, (38)
pDlkn ≤ P
D
max, ∀l, k, n. (39)
Note that (33) is still non-convex due to the inter-tier
interference. To transform it into a convex form, the uplink
channel state information (CSI) vector of the h-th HUE on
the n-th subcarrier, which represents the CSI from the h-th
HUE to the HPN, from the h-th HUE to LPNs, and from the
h-th HUE to the receiver of other DUEs that share the n-th
subcarrier, is given by
GHhn =
[
hHHhn , h
HL
hn1, · · ·h
HL
hnl · · · , h
HD
hn1, · · · h
HD
hnl · · ·
]T
,
(40)
where h,m, l ∈
{
h, l|∃h,m, lαHhn, α
L
lmn, α
D
lkn 6= 0
}
. Accu-
rately, under given subcarrier allocation scheme, at most one
LUE can be allocated to the n-th subcarrier of the l-th LPN.
Similarly, the uplink CSI vector for the LUE on the n-th
subcarrier of the l-th LPN can be given as:
GLl =
[
hLHlmn, h
LL
lmn1, · · · h
LL
lmnl · · · , h
LD
lmn1, · · ·h
LD
lmnl · · ·
]T
,
(41)
where h,m, l ∈
{
h, l|∃h,m, lαHhn, α
L
lmn, α
D
lkn 6= 0
}
. Simi-
larly, the uplink CSI vector for the DUE on the n-th subcarrier
of the l-th LPN can be given as:
GDl =
[
hDHlkn , h
DL
lkn1, · · ·h
DL
lknl · · · , h
DD
lkn1 · · · , h
DD
lknl · · ·
]T
,
(42)
where h, k, l ∈
{
h, l|∃h, k, lαHhn, α
L
lmn, α
D
lkn 6= 0
}
.
Combine these three CSIs GHhn, G
L
l , G
D
l together, it can
be derived that on the n-th subcarrier, the CSI matrix among
all users on the n-th subcarrier can be expressed as:
Gn =

GHhn,GL1 ,GL2 , · · ·GLl , · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPN
GD1 ,G
D
2 · · ·G
D
l · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2Duserpair
GEn

 .
(43)
Similarly, the CSI between users and the eavesdropper on
the n-th subcarrier is given by
GEn =
hHEhn , hLE1mn, hLE2mn, · · ·hLElmn, · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
LPN
hDE1kn, h
DE
2kn, · · ·h
DE
lkn · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
D2D

 .
(44)
Note that for a given subcarrier allocation scheme, Gn and
GEn are fixed, which means that the number of users (HUE,
LUE and DUE) on the n-th subcarrier is determined and the
CSI matrix can be known. Without loss of generality, let Gn
be a J × J matrix which denotes that the number of users
on the n-th channel is J , and let GEn be a J × 1 vector.
The transmit power matrix of the J users is given by pn. A
nonnegative matrix is defined Fn with entries
(Fn)ij =
{
0 ifi = j
(Gn)ij
(Gn)jj
ifi 6= j
, (45)
and the vector vn =
(
σ2
(Gn)11
, σ
2
(Gn)22
, · · · σ
2
(Gn)JJ
)T
.
Now, the SINR of the j-th user in the uplink is (Sn)j =
pnj
(Fnpn+vn)j
, and its corresponding capacity can be expressed
as:
(Cn)j = log
(
1 + (Sn)j
)
. (46)
Similarly, we can have
(
FEn
)
ij
=
{
0 ifi = j
(GEn )i
(GEn )j
ifi 6= j
, (47)
and the vector vEn =
(
σ2
(GEn )1
, σ
2
(GEn )2
, · · · σ
2
(GEn )J
)T
.
7Now the SINR of the j-th user in the wiretap channel can
be expressed as
(
SEn
)
j
=
pnj
(FEn pn+v
E
n )j
, and the data rate is(
CEn
)
j
= log
(
1 +
(
SEn
)
j
)
. Rewrite (33) as:
max
{pn}
J∑
j=1
(Cn)j −
J∑
j=1
(
CEn
)
j
(48)
s.t. (Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
≥
(
CSmin
)
j
, ∀j, (49)
0 ≤ (pn)j ≤ (pmax)j , ∀j, (50)
where CSmin and pmax are the minimum secrecy data rate and
maximum transmit power constraints, respectively. Due to the
inter-tier interference, the optimization problem in (48) is still
hard to be derived. To solve this problem, we can define the
vector αj
(αj)i =
{
0 i 6= j
1 i = j
(51)
and the constraint (50) can be expressed as:
αTj pn ≤ (pmax)j∀j. (52)
To transfer the constraint (50), we can have the following
theorem:
Theorem 2: Let
Bnj = Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j , (53)
BEnj = F
E
n +
1
(pmax)j
vEnα
T
j , (54)
qn = Fnpn + vn, (55)
qEn = F
E
npn + v
E
n , (56)
then constraint (50) is equal to:
Bnjdiag(e
Cn)qn ≤ (I+Bnj)qn∀j, (57)
BEnjdiag(e
CEn )qEn ≤
(
I+BEnj
)
qEn ∀j. (58)
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Based on Theorem 2, the optimization problem in (48) can
be transformed to
max
{Cn,CEn ,qn,q
E
n }
J∑
j=1
(Cn)j −
J∑
j=1
(
CEn
)
j
(59)
s.t. (Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
≥
(
CSmin
)
j
, ∀j, (60)
Bnjdiag(e
Cn)qn ≤ (I+Bnj)qn, ∀j,
(61)
BEnjdiag(e
CEn )qEn ≤
(
I+BEnj
)
qEn , ∀j.
(62)
Obviously, the objective function (59) has been transferred
to be linear. However, this optimization problem is still non-
convex because of the non-convex constraints (61) and (62).
These two constraints can be transformed into be convex by
using the following theorem.
Theorem 3: If the non-negative matrix B˜nj =
(I+Bnj)
−1
Bnj and B˜
E
nj =
(
I+BEnj
)−1
BEnj holds, the
optimization problem in (59) can be transformed into a convex
form as:
max
{Cn,CEn }
J∑
j=1
(Cn)j −
J∑
j=1
(
CEn
)
j
(63)
s.t. (Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
≥
(
CSmin
)
j
, ∀j, (64)
log
(
ρ
(
B˜njdiag
(
eCn
)))
≤ 0, ∀j, (65)
log
(
ρ
(
B˜Enjdiag
(
eC
E
n
)))
≤ 0, ∀j, (66)
where ρ (·) is the the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of a non-
negative matrix.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
Due to the log-convexity property of the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue, the constraints (65) and (66) are convex. Now
the concerned optimization problem in (59) is a convex
optimization problem and can be solved in polynomial time.
However, such problem is very hard to solve by the traditional
sub-gradient convex optimization method because it is difficult
to get the closed-form expressions of Cn and C
E
n , which is
essential to achieve the solution. To deal with this challenge, a
novel method which is effective for this problem is proposed
in the following content.
The Lagrangian function of problem (63) can be expressed
as:
L(Cn,C
E
n ,λ,β,µ) =
J∑
j=1
(Cn)j −
J∑
j=1
(
CEn
)
j
+
J∑
j=1
λj
(
(Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
− (CminS )j
)
−
J∑
j=1
βj log
(
ρ
(
B˜njdiag
(
eCn
)))
−
J∑
j=1
µj log
(
ρ
(
B˜Enjdiag
(
eC
E
n
)))
,
(67)
where λ,β,µ are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to
the constraints.
Then, the Lagrangian dual function can be expressed as:
g(λ,β,µ) = max
{Cn,CEn }
L(Cn,C
E
n ,λ,β,µ). (68)
Therefore, the dual optimization problem can be formulated
as:
min
{λ,β,µ}
g(λ,β,µ)
s.t. λ  0,β  0,µ  0. (69)
Since the optimization problem in (63) is convex, the duality
gap between the primal problem and its dual problem is zero,
which illustrates that the primal problem can be solved by
solving its dual problem(69). The sub-gradient-based method
can be utilized to solve (69) and the sub-gradient of the
8Lagrange multipliers in the dual function in the i-th iteration
can be written as:
∇λ(i+1)(j) =
(
C(i)n
)
j
−
(
CE(i)n
)
j
− (CminS )j , 1 ≤ j ≤ J,
(70)
∇β(i+1)(j) = log(ρ(B˜njdiag(e
C(i)n ))), 1 ≤ j ≤ J, (71)
∇µ(i+1)(j) = log(ρ(B˜Enjdiag(e
CE(i)n ))), 1 ≤ j ≤ J (72)
where
(
C
(i)
n
)
j
and
(
C
E(i)
n
)
j
are the capacity and leakage ca-
pacity of the j-th UE on the n-th subcarrier in the i-th iteration,
respectively. ∇λ(i+1)(j), ∇β(i+1)(j) and ∇µ(i+1)(j) denote
the j-th sub-gradient corresponding to λ, β and µ utilized in
the (i+1)-th iteration. Therefore, the update equations for the
dual variables in the (i+ 1)-th iteration can be expressed as:
λ(i+1)(j) =[
λ(i)(j)−ξλ(i)(j)
((
C(i)n
)
j
−
(
CE(i)n
)
j
− (CminS )j
)]+
(73)
β(i+1)(j) =
[
β(i)(j)−ξβ(i)(j) log(ρ(B˜njdiag(e
C(i)n )))
]+
(74)
µ(i+1)(j) =
[
µ(i)(j)−ξµ(i)(j) log(ρ(B˜
E
njdiag(e
CE(i)n )))
]+
(75)
where ξλ(i)(j), ξβ(i)(j) and ξµ(i) (j) are positive step sizes.
According to the above derivations, a sub-gradient method
based iteration algorithm is presented to solve (69) as shown
in Algorithm 1.
To solve (76), rewrite (67) with given Lagrange multiplier
λ(i),β(i),µ(i) as:
L(Cn,C
E
n ) =
J∑
j=1
(Cn)j −
J∑
j=1
(
CEn
)
j
+
J∑
j=1
λ
(i)
j
(
(Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
− (CminS )j
)
−
J∑
j=1
β
(i)
j log
(
ρ
(
B˜njdiag
(
eCn
)))
−
J∑
j=1
µ
(i)
j log
(
ρ
(
B˜Enjdiag
(
eC
E
n
)))
(77)
= f
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
+ g
(
Cn,C
E
n ,
)
(78)
Algorithm 1 Sub-gradient method based iteration algorithm
for the outer loop optimziation
1: Set the iteration index i = 1. Initialize the Lagrange
multiplier λ(i),β(i),µ(i), the step size ξλ, ξβ, ξµ, the
maximum number of iterations Imax and the iteration
threshold δ.
2: for 1 ≤ i ≤ Imax
3: Calculate Cn
(i),C
E(i)
n which can be expressed as(
Cn
(i),CE(i)n
)
=
argmin
{Cn(i),C
E(i)
n }
L(Cn
(i),CE(i)n ,λ
(i),β(i),µ(i)) (76)
4:
λ(i+1)(j) =[
λ(i)(j)−ξλ(i)(j)
((
C(i)n
)
j
−
(
CE(i)n
)
j
− (CminS )j
)]+
;
5: β(i+1)(j) =
[
β(i)(j)−ξβ(i)(j) log(ρ(B˜njdiag(e
C(i)n )))
]+
;
6: µ(i+1)(j) =
[
µ(i)(j)−ξµ(i)(j) log(ρ(B˜
E
njdiag(e
CE(i)n )))
]+
;
7: if
∣∣λ(i+1)(j)− λ(i)(j)∣∣ + ∣∣β(i+1)(j)− β(i)(j)∣∣ +∣∣µ(i+1)(j)− µ(i)(j)∣∣ ≤ δ
8: break out;
9: end if
10: i = i+ 1;
11: end for
12: return Cn
(i) −C
E(i)
n .
where
f
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
=−
J∑
j=1
β
(i)
j log
(
ρ
(
B˜njdiag
(
eCn
)))
−
J∑
j=1
µ
(i)
j log
(
ρ
(
B˜Enjdiag
(
eC
E
n
)))
g
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
=
J∑
j=1
(Cn)j −
J∑
j=1
(
CEn
)
j
(79)
+
J∑
j=1
λ
(i)
j
(
(Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
− (CminS )j
)
.
(80)
It is obvious that g
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
is closed proper convex
function and f
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
is differentiable. So the proximal
gradient method can be used to solve (76) according to the
proximal theory. The proximal operator of f
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
is
calculated as:
proxg(Cn,C
E
n ) =
(
1 + λ
(i)
j
)(
(Cn)j −
(
CEn
)
j
− I
)
. (81)
The partial derivatives of f
(
Cn,C
E
n
)
with respect to
Cn,C
E
n are given by
9∂f
dCn
= −
J∑
j=1
β
(i)
j x(B˜njdiag(e
Cn)) ◦ y(B˜njdiag(e
Cn)),
(82)
∂f
dCEn
= −
J∑
j=1
µ
(i)
j x(B˜
E
njdiag(e
CEn )) ◦ y(B˜Enjdiag(e
CEn )).
(83)
where x(·) and y(·) represent the right and left Perron-
Frobenius eigenvalue, respectively.
It obvious that problem (76) is convex because it is a
dual problem [40]. Due to the proximal gradient method, the
proximal operator of (76) has a fixed point, which is the
optimal value of (76), too. Therefore, an iterative algorithm is
proposed to find the fixed point as shown by the Algorithm 2.
In fact, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are the outer loop and
inner loop, respectively. On each subcarrier, the Algorithm
1 is executed to solve the equivalent convex optimization
problem of D2D underlaying HetNets, while the Algorithm 2
is utilized to solve the dual problem proposed in Algorithm
1.
The complexity of the proposed algorithm is analyzed and
compared with the algorithm presented in [13] as follows.
• The complexity of the subcarrier allocation scheme is
linear with O(N(H + LM + LK)).
• The complexity of the power allocation algorithm is
determined by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. The com-
plexity of Algorithm 1 is linear with the number of dual
factors, i.e., O(J). The complexity of Algorithm 2 is lin-
ear with the number of the elements of Cn
(i),C
E(i)
n , i.e.,
O(J). Therefore, the complexity of the power allocation
scheme is O(J2).
Therefore, the total complexity of the proposed algorithm
is O(NJ2(H +LM +LK)). The algorithm proposed in [13]
has a complexity of O(NK(N + M)). Compared with the
algorithm presented in [13], the algorithm proposed in this
paper considers both subcarrier and power allocation scheme
at the expense of the complexity. Due to including subcarrier
and power allocation executions, the proposed algorithm in
this paper can be solved in polynomial time and is acceptable
in practice.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the secrecy capacity performance of the D2D
communication underlaying HetNets and the corresponding
optimization results are numerically evaluated with simula-
tions. In our simulations, one HPN is concerned, and all LPNs
are uniformly located in the circle with the distance of 1000m
whose center is the HPN. The cell radius of HPN and LPN are
800m and 200m, respectively. The minimum allowed distance
between HPN and users is 50 m and the minimum allowed
distance between LPN and users is 20 m to protect users from
radiation. It is assumed that H = 2, i.e., there are 2 HUEs
who access to the HPN. Denote M = 5 and K = 5, which
suggests that 5 LUEs and 5 D2D links randomly locate in the
coverage of each LPN. All of LPNs share N = 8 subcarriers
Algorithm 2 The dual problem solution for the inner loop
optimization
1: Set the iteration index s = 1. Initialize the Lagrange mul-
tiplier λ(i),β(i),µ(i) of the i-th iteration of Algorithm 1,
the maximum number of iterations Smax and the iteration
threshold η.
2: for 1 ≤ s ≤ Smax
3: Calculate
C(s+1)n = proxg(C
(s)
n −
∂f
dC
(s)
n
,CE(s)n ), (84)
CE(s+1)n = proxg(C
(s)
n ,C
E(s)
n −
∂f
dC
E(s)
n
). (85)
4: if
∣∣∣C(s+1)n −C(s)n ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣CE(s+1)n −CE(s)n ∣∣∣ ≤ η
5: break out;
6: end if
7: s = s+ 1
8: end for
9: return C
(s)
n and C
E(s)
n
and each subcarrier occupies 200 KHz. On each subcarrier, an
eavesdropper exists in the concerned scenario and it locates
randomly.
The total transmit power of HPN is 43 dBm and equally
allocated on all subcarriers. The transmit power of the trans-
mitter of DUE is 15 dBm and the distance between the
transmitter and the receiver is 10 m. It is assumed that the
path loss model is expressed as 31.5 + 40.0 ∗ log10(d) for
the D2D link and the LPN-to-LUE, LPN-D2D and D2D-LUE
link with short transmit distance, while 31.5+ 35.0 ∗ log10(d)
is used for other long links, where d denotes the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver in meters. The number
of simulation snapshots is set at 1000. In all snapshots, the
fast-fading coefficients are all generated as independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh random variables with
unit variances.
A. Convergence of the Proposed Algorithm
To evaluate the convergence performance of the algorithm
under more users, we set H = 10, N = 20, M = 15
and K = 15, respectively. The convergence of the proposed
algorithm with different QoS requirements is shown in Fig.
2. It can be obviously illustrated that the proposed algorithm
converges within 5 iteration numbers for different QoS require-
ments, which suggests that the proposed algorithm can work
efficiently. Besides, the different levels of QoS requirements
have significant impacts on the performance of the secrecy
capacity. To evaluate the influence of the QoS requirements,
three QoS levels are set and the maximum allowed transmit
power of LPNs is set at 24 dBm. Fig. 2 shows that the secrecy
capacity of the system decrease with the QoS requirement
increasing. In the case of high QoS requirement, more transmit
power should be allocated to the user who is unable to
achieve the QoS requirement, thus the system performance
has a decrease. So there exists a balance between the system
performance and the user performance.
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Fig. 2. Convergence evolution under different QoS requirements
B. Secure Capacity Performances of the Proposed Solutions
In this part, key factors impacting on the secrecy capacity
performances of the proposed algorithm are evaluated. Since
the transmit power constraint and the QoS requirement are
two main constraints in the proposed optimization problem,
the impact of these two factors are evaluated in Fig. 3 and Fig.
4, respectively. Besides, the average secrecy capacity per UE
is more significant than the total secrecy capacity to evaluate
the performance of the D2D underlaying HetNets when the
number of UEs changes frequently. Therefore, to evaluate
the impact of the number of UEs to the D2D underlaying
HetNets, the relationship between the number of UEs and
the average secrecy capacity per UE should be evaluated.
Since LUEs usually contribute more capacity to the network
than HUEs and DUEs, without loss of generality, only the
relationship between the number of LUEs per LPN and the
average secrecy capacity per LUE is evaluated in this part
and the corresponding simulation result is shown in Fig. 5. It
should be noted that in HetNets, HPNs are mainly deployed to
provide seamless coverage and LPNs which are closer to users
are deployed in hot spots to provide high capacity. Therefore,
the capacity of the network is mainly determined by LPNs
and only the maximum transmit power allowance of LPN is
simulated in this paper.
In Fig. 3, the secrecy capacity performances under varied
QoS requirements with a step size of 0.02 are compared among
different maximum allowed transmit power. When the QoS
requirement is not sufficiently large, the secrecy performance
decreases slowly with the increasing QoS requirement because
most users can set a sufficiently high transmit power to satisfy
its QoS requirement. However, when the QoS requirement
becomes large enough, more users can afford the QoS require-
ment and then more transmit power has to be allocated to these
users to meet the QoS requirement. Furthermore, it can be
illustrated from Fig. 3 that with the larger maximum allowed
transmit power of LPN, the secrecy capacity performance
increases, which has a similar trend with Fig. 4.
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Fig. 3. Secure capacity performance comparisons under different QoS
requirements
To further evaluate the impact of the maximum allowed
transmit power of LPNs on the secure capacity performances,
four baselines are presented. The first baseline is the upper
bound of this problem and it is calculated by the exhaustive
method. We do the power allocation algorithm for each possi-
ble subcarrier allocation scheme and get the optimal subcarrier
and power allocation for the problem. The second baseline is
proposed by [3]. In [3], users that cause severe interference are
scheduled to the other subcarriers to alleviate interference. For
example, if user A interferes other users seriously on the i-th
subcarrier, it can be scheduled to the j-th subcarrier, on which
the interference can be almost avoided. The third baseline is
based on the classic orthogonal subcarrier allocation which has
been widely used in HetNets. The fourth baseline is based on
the fixed power scheme, i.e., the transmit power allocated to
LUEs is same and fixed. Fig. 4 compares the secure capacity
performance of different algorithms in terms of maximum
allowed transmit power of LPNs. In this simulation case,
the QoS requirement is set at 0 and the maximum allowed
transmit power of LPNs varies within [14 dBm, 36 dBm]
with the step size of 2 dBm. Fig. 4 shows that when the
transmit power is not sufficiently high, the secure capacity
performance increases with the transmit power rises because
the interference is still not the bottleneck and the increment of
secure capacity mainly depends on increasing transmit power.
However, when the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs
is sufficiently high, the interference limits the increase of the
secure capacity. Thus, no more transmit power is allocated to
users. As shown in Fig. 4, the proposed algorithm is closed to
the upper bound and outperforms the algorithm presented in
[3] because the reference [3] just proposed some mechanisms
to mitigate the influence of interference. And the algorithm
presented in [3] is better than the orthogonal subcarrier al-
location due to the benefit of frequency reuse. Furthermore,
the fixed power scheme has the worst performance because it
takes no measures to optimize the secure capacity performance
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of the whole system.
Fig. 5 illustrates the relationship between the number of
LUEs and the average secrecy capacity per LUE to evaluate
the impact of the number of UEs to the whole network. In
this simulation case, the QoS requirement is set at 0.1 bps/Hz
and the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs varies
from 18 dBm to 22 dBm with a step size of 2 dBm. The
minimum number of LUEs per LPN is set to 1. Since the
number of subcarriers is set to 8, which suggests that at most
8 LUEs can simultaneously connect to the LPN in each time
slot in each LPN, the maximum number of LUEs per LPN
are set to 8. It can be seen in Fig. 5 that as the number of
LUEs per LPN increases, the average secrecy capacity per
LUE decreases because the intra-tier interference increases
with more LUEs connecting to the same LPN. The augment of
intra-tier interference leads to the abatement of average secrecy
capacity per LUE. However, it can be calculated from Fig.
5 that the total secrecy capacity of the whole LUEs keeps
increasing as the number of LUEs per LPN rises, because
when more LUEs connect to the LPN, more subcarriers can
be allocated to these LUEs until the number of LUEs is equal
to the number of the subcarriers. Besides, Fig. 5 shows that
the higher the maximum transmit power allowance of LPN is,
the better the secrecy capacity of the whole network achieves,
which has the same trend as shown in Fig. 3.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the secrecy-optimized resource allocation
for the device-to-device (D2D) communication underlaying
heterogeneous networks (HetNets) has been researched. In the
concerned system model, there densely exist high power node
and low power node with D2D communication, therefore, the
inter-tier interference is always severe, which leads to the
secrecy-optimized maximization problem being non-convex.
To solve this non-convex optimization problem, the primal
non-convex optimization problem has been transformed into
the convex issue with several steps. Firstly, the objective
function with several constraints are transformed into a matrix
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Fig. 5. Average secure capacity per LUE comparisons under different number
of LUEs per LPN
form. Secondly, the equivalent convex form of the maximiza-
tion problem for the matrix form is derived according to the
Perron-Frobenius theory. Thirdly, the proximal operator of
the transformed convex problem is evaluated. Then, a novel
iterative algorithm based on the proximal theory to solve the
equivalent convex problem is proposed.
Simulation results have demonstrated that the secrecy capac-
ity has a significant improvement and the proposed algorithm
is effective and converges fast. Furthermore, comparing with
four baselines, the proposal has a significant performance gain
on the secrecy capacity of the whole network. In the future, the
non-ideal CSIs should be considered to optimize the secrecy
capacity. In addition, the advanced inter-tier interference in
the physical layer and the dynamical queue characteristics in
the upper layer should be jointly considered with the radio
resource allocation to optimize the secrecy capacity in the D2D
communication underlying HetNets.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Without loss of generality, let xp denote the optimal x.
Thus, It can be derived as:
xp = argmax
{xi}
(f(xi,y
∗
i )) . (86)
Assume that there exists xj 6= x
∗ which is better than xi.
Therefore, the following equation holds.
f(xp,y
∗
p) < f(xj ,y
∗
j ), (87)
which means that
xj = argmax
{xi}
(f(xi,y
∗
i )) . (88)
It is obviously that (88)s conflict with (86). Thus xp is the
optimal x and theorem 1 holds.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (46), it can be derived that e(Cn)j − 1 =
(Sn)j =
pnj
(Fnpn+vn)j
which is the same as:
(
diag(eCn)− I
)
(Fnpn + vn) = pn. (89)
Substituting (55) into (89), it can be derived as:
diag(eCn)qn = pn + qn. (90)
Multiply both sides of (90) by Bnj which is given by (53),
we can have(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
diag(eCn)qn
=
(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
pn +
(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn
(91)
=Fnpn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j pn +
(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn.
(92)
According to (52), αTj pn ≤ (pmax)j . Thus
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j pn = vn
αTj pn
(pmax)j
≤ vn, (93)
and
Fnpn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j pn +
(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn
≤ Fnpn + vn +
(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn (94)
= qn +
(
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn (95)
=
(
I+ Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn, (96)
where (95) is derived by (55). Now the formula can be derived
as: (
Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
diag(eCn)qn
≤
(
I+ Fn +
1
(pmax)j
vnα
T
j
)
qn. (97)
Substituting (53) into the above inequality, (57) can be
derived. Similarly, (58) can be derived according to (54) and
(56).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Since (I+Bnj)
−1
exists, multiply both sides of constraint
(61) by (I+Bnj)
−1
, and the following equation can be
derived as:
Bnjdiag(e
Cn)qn ≤ (I+Bnj)qn
⇔ (I+Bnj)
−1
Bnjdiag(e
Cn)qn ≤ qn
⇔ B˜njdiag(e
Cn)qn ≤ qn. (98)
According to the subinvariance theorem [41], if a nonneg-
ative matrix A, a positive number a and a nonnegative vector
v satisfy Av ≤ av, then ρ (A) ≤ a and the equality holds if
and only if Av = av. Let A = B˜njdiag(e
Cn), a = 1 and
v = qn and rewrite (61) as ρ
(
B˜njdiag
(
eCn
))
≤ 1, which
is the same as log
(
ρ
(
B˜njdiag
(
eCn
)))
≤ 0. Similarly, it
can be derived that log
(
ρ
(
B˜Enjdiag
(
eC
E
n
)))
≤ 0.
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